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Abstract:		
Almost	three	decades	after	the	regime	change	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe,	some	of	the	
political	 parties	 that	 were	 successors	 of	 the	 communists	 continue	 to	 enjoy	 important	
electoral	 support.	 This	 article	 makes	 an	 attempt	 to	 understand	 why	 this	 happens	 and	
focuses	on	the	role	of	the	party	organisation.	It	includes	a	qualitative	analysis	on	the	typical	
case	 of	 the	 Communist	 Party	 of	 Bohemia	 and	Moravia	 (KSČM)	 based	 on	 series	 of	 semi-
structured	interviews	with	party	cadres	and	independent	researchers.	These	reveal	that	the	
stable	territorial	distribution	of	their	performance	midst	significant	electoral	volatility	since	
2010	highlights	an	organisational	impasse	within	the	party.	
Keywords:	successor	parties,	organisation,	electoral	support,	Czech	Republic	
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1. Introduction	
Recent	studies	on	the	electoral	performance	of	parties	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe	
(CEE)	 reveal	 the	 vital	 role	 of	 their	 organisational	 strength	 (Biezen	 2003;	 Gherghina	 2014;	
Tavits	2013;	Webb	&	White	2007).	Political	parties	do	not	exist	in	vacuum,	but	are	integral	
part	of	society	 through	their	organisational	presence	across	communities	and	through	the	
activities	of	 their	members	during	and	between	elections	 (Gherghina	et	al.	 2018).	 In	 such	
context,	 parties	 with	 extensive	 organisational	 network	 and	 membership,	 continuity	 of	
representation	 and	 decentralised	 candidate	 selection	 are	 more	 capable	 to	 establish	 firm	
links	 with	 society	 and,	 thus,	 improve	 their	 electoral	 performance	 (Gherghina	 2014).	 The	
recent	 experience	of	 the	 communist	 successor	 parties,	 however,	 questions	 the	 validity	 of	
this	notion	in	absolute	terms.	On	the	one	hand,	existing	studies	on	parties	with	roots	in	the	
communist	regime	in	the	form	of	property,	membership	and/or	leadership	(Ishiyama	1995	p.	
148),	emphasised	the	crucial	role	of	their	party	organisations	for	their	electoral	performance.	
In	 the	 1990s	 these	 parties	 inherited	 from	 their	 predecessors	 extensive	 and	 largely	 intact	
organisational	networks	with	considerable	memberships	 that	aided	their	electoral	 survival	
in	 the	 initial	 democratic	 elections	 following	 the	 end	 of	 the	 authoritarian	 regimes	 in	 CEE	
(Bozoki	 &	 Ishiyama	 2002;	 Grzymala-Busse	 2002).	 Even	 nowadays	 communist	 successor	
parties	remain	among	the	largest	organisations	in	the	party	systems	in	CEE	(van	Biezen	et	al.	
2012).	Yet,	while	these	parties	have	extensive	organisational	networks,	some	continuity	of	
representation	 and	 centralised	 candidate	 selection	 (Bozoki	&	 Ishiyama	2002),	 it	was	 their	
non-material	resources,	such	as	usable	pasts	and	cadre	expertise	that	shaped	their	electoral	
redemption	and	eventual	return	to	power	by	the	turn	of	the	century	(Grzymala-Busse	2002).	
This	suggests	that	the	strength	of	party	organisation	should	be	rather	understood	in	relative	
terms.	Main	puzzle	 in	 this	 respect	 is	 to	what	extent	 the	party	organisations	of	communist	
successors	 in	Central	 and	Eastern	Europe	explain	 their	 electoral	performances	 in	 the	past	
decade.	
A	 suitable	methodological	 and	 theoretical	 approach	 to	 this	 puzzle	 is	 the	 territorial	
distribution	of	their	electoral	support	at	national	elections.	A	focus	on	it	offers	a	contextual	
explanation	for	their	electoral	performance,	as	it	holds	the	unit	of	analysis	(a	political	party)	
and	the	timeframe	(an	electoral	period)	constant	 (Snyder	2001),	 thus,	placing	the	party	 in	
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different	 socio-economic	 and	 political	 circumstances	 across	 a	 country.	 In	 doing	 so,	 this	
approach	 focuses	 on	 the	 role	 of	 party	 organisation	 in	 a	 variety	 of	 social	 settings	 and	 its	
ability	 to	 use	 these	 settings	 for	 its	 electoral	 goals.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 role	 of	 party	
organisation	in	different	conditions	reveals	how	well	political	parties	use	their	organisational	
capabilities,	 understood	 as	 the	 organisational	 resources	 and	 opportunities	 at	 a	 party’s	
disposal,	 for	 electoral	mobilisation.	Main	 research	question	of	 this	 article,	 therefore,	 is	 to	
what	extent	the	organisational	capabilities	of	communist	successor	parties	in	CEE	contribute	
to	 their	 territorial	 distribution	 of	 electoral	 support?	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 territorial	
distribution	of	electoral	support	for	a	communist	successor	may	be	a	product	of	the	external	
socio-economic	 and	 political	 environment	 (H1),	 thus	 revealing	 a	 limited	 organisational	
contribution.	On	the	other	hand,	a	party	may	successfully	build	up	electoral	support	across	a	
country	through	its	organisational	capabilities	(H2),	highlighting	the	considerable	role	of	its	
party	organisation	in	this	respect.	
This	 article	 focuses	 on	 the	 case	 of	 the	 Communist	 Party	 of	 Bohemia	 and	Moravia	
(KSČM)	 from	 the	 Czech	 Republic	 since	 2010.	 While	 the	 party	 both	 excelled	 and	 failed	
electorally	 in	 the	 decade	 since	 the	Great	 Recession,	 its	 territorial	 distribution	 of	 electoral	
support	at	national	elections	remains	rather	stable,	as	the	party	mobilises	relatively	similar	
levels	of	electoral	support	across	the	14	electoral	constituencies	of	the	country.	A	study	on	
the	reasons	for	this	development	reveals	that	the	party	is	not	able	to	use	its	organisational	
capabilities	 to	mobilise	 support.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 party	 remains	 present	 across	 the	
country	through	its	comprehensive	organisational	network	that	allows	it	to	mobilise	its	core	
voters	across	the	Czech	Republic.	On	the	other	hand,	KSČM	struggles	to	expand	its	electoral	
base	 due	 to	 declining	 activeness	 of	 its	 party	 structures	 across	 the	 country	 and	 due	 to	 its	
inability	 to	 transpose	 its	 presence	 and	 engagement	 with	 communities	 into	 a	 source	 for	
electoral	 mobilisation	 at	 national	 elections.	 Main	 reason	 for	 these	 challenges	 is	 an	
organisational	impasse,	characterised	by	an	organisational	disconnect	between	national	and	
regional	party	structures	and	by	declining	membership	turnaround.	Overall,	the	experience	
of	 KSČM	 could	 not	 confirm	 neither	 hypothesis,	 suggesting	 that	 while	 the	 organisational	
strength	is	an	important	factor	for	the	electoral	performance	of	parties	in	CEE,	the	way	this	
strength	has	been	used	by	a	party	accounts	for	the	extent	of	its	influence.	
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Basis	for	this	argument	is	the	qualitative	analysis	of	semi-structured	interviews	with	
party	representatives	on	national	and	regional	level	and	independent	researchers,	held	prior	
to	 the	2017	general	 election.	 These	 interviews	aimed	 to	 investigate	 the	 role	of	 the	KSČM	
regional	 party	 organisation	 for	 the	 electoral	 performance	 at	 national	 elections	 in	 three	
Czech	 regions	 (Ústí	 nad	 Labem,	 South	 Moravia,	 and	 Prague),	 where	 the	 party	 mobilises	
consistently	different	levels	of	electoral	support	at	the	2010	and	2013	elections.	This	article	
is	 structured	as	 follows:	 the	 following	 two	sections	discuss	 the	 theoretical	background	 for	
the	 potential	 role	 of	 party	 organisation	 to	 the	 territorial	 distribution	 of	 electoral	
performance	 of	 a	 party.	 Afterwards	 there	 is	 a	 brief	 presentation	 and	 justification	 of	 the	
research	methodology,	 and	 three	 sections	 that	 analyse	 the	 interview	 data	 in	 light	 of	 the	
research	question.	A	conclusion	summarises	 the	overall	argument	of	 this	article	and	 looks	
into	 the	 broader	 implications	 for	 the	 party	 systems	 and	 for	 the	 electoral	 performance	 of	
communist	successor	parties	in	CEE	in	recent	times.	
2. The	role	of	party	organisation	for	the	territorial	distribution	of	its	electoral	
support	
The	party	organisation	plays	a	crucial	role	for	the	territorial	distribution	of	electoral	
performance	 as	 it	 enables	 a	 party	 to	 accommodate	 the	 diverse	 social	 contexts	 across	 a	
country	in	order	to	handle	the	effects	of	its	political	structures.	In	this	sense,	a	political	party	
can	 shape	 its	 electoral	 performance	 through	 its	 own	organisational	 capabilities.	 The	main	
organisational	capabilities	of	a	party	that	allows	it	to	do	so	are	its	organisational	presence,	
engagement	with	communities,	and	transposition	of	local	legitimacy.	
2.1. Organisational	presence	
Firstly,	 organisational	 presence	 refers	 to	 the	 level	 of	 party	 complexity.	 Having	 a	
comprehensive	territorial	coverage	across	a	country	through	a	network	of	regional	and	local	
organisations,	 represented	 by	 active	members	 is	 an	 important	 prerequisite	 for	 a	 party	 to	
successfully	reach	potential	voters	and	mobilise	them	electorally	(Harmel	&	Janda	1982).	A	
party	 organisation	 at	 a	 particular	 place	 offers	 a	 stable	 basis	 to	 facilitate	 the	 process	 of	
socialisation	 between	 a	 party	 and	 community	 and	perpetuate	 its	 effects	 throughout	 time	
(Johnston	 &	 Pattie	 2006).	 Furthermore,	 regional	 and	 local	 party	 structures	 serve	 as	
important	campaign	 resource,	 through	which	a	party	can	spread	 its	electoral	messages	 to	
potential	voters	(Seyd	&	Whiteley	2002).	Organisational	presence	is	expected	to	be	the	main	
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organisational	 asset	 for	 communist	 successor	 parties	 to	 influence	 their	 territorial	
distribution	of	electoral	support.	Previous	studies	regularly	emphasise	their	comprehensive	
organisational	networks	and	high	levels	of	membership	in	comparison	to	their	political	and	
electoral	 opponents	 (Bozoki	 &	 Ishiyama	 2002).	 Yet,	 despite	 this	 organisational	 advantage	
their	 membership	 experiences	 continue	 to	 decline	 (van	 Biezen	 et	 al.	 2012),	 which	 may	
prevent	 communist	 successors	 from	maximising	 their	electoral	potential	across	a	 country.	
Nevertheless,	 it	 is	 expected	 that	 the	 territorial	 outreach	of	 its	 party	 organisation	 and	 the	
concentration	 of	 its	 members	 across	 a	 country	 reveal	 the	 organisational	 abilities	 of	 a	
communist	successor	to	influence	the	territorial	distribution	of	its	electoral	performance.	
2.2. Engagement	with	communities	
Secondly,	 engagement	 represents	 the	 level	 of	 activity	 of	 party	 organisation	 across	
communities.	Being	present	across	a	country	is	not	enough	for	a	party	to	shape	its	territorial	
distribution	of	electoral	support.	There	is	need	for	active	interaction	with	society	in	order	to	
successfully	develop	a	 lasting	association	between	a	voter	and	a	party	and,	 thus,	 improve	
the	electoral	potential	of	a	party	within	a	community.	 In	other	words,	a	party	needs	to	be	
active	in	a	community	in	order	to	become	a	viable	electoral	option	for	the	electorate.	To	do	
so,	 a	 communist	 successor	 may	 rely	 on	 two	 specific	 factors.	 First,	 it	 can	 be	 engaged	 in	
regional	and	local	politics.	By	representing	particular	regional	or	local	interests	in	the	system	
of	 regional	 governance,	 a	 communist	 successor	may	 in	 fact	 use	 this	 system	 to	build	 local	
legitimacy	 across	 a	 territory	 that	 can	be	mobilised	 electorally	 at	 national	 elections.	While	
such	 engagement	 may	 not	 be	 completely	 relevant	 for	 communist	 successors,	 as	 the	
majority	of	the	post-socialist	democratic	systems	across	CEE	remain	unitary,	the	history	of	
their	 predecessors	 during	 the	 inter-war	 period	 highlights	 the	 electoral	 potential	 of	 using	
regional	governance.	For	example,	between	1910	and	1923	the	Bulgarian	Communist	Party	
established	 in	 the	 places,	 where	 it	 governed,	 so	 called	 ‘municipal	 communes’,	 providing	
cradle-to-the-grade	services	and,	thus,	promoting	 its	political	program.	 In	this	respect,	 the	
more	engaged	a	party	is	 in	regional	and	local	politics	across	a	country,	the	more	impactful	
would	be	its	party	organisation	on	the	territorial	distribution	of	electoral	support.	
Second,	 a	 party	 can	 interact	 with	 a	 community	 through	 its	 relations	 with	 mass	
organisations	 and	 social	 movements	 that	 share	 its	 ideological	 and	 programmatic	 aims.	
Supporting	 or	 facilitating	 joint	 campaigns	 with	 non-party	 organisations	 highlights	 the	
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sensitivity	 of	 a	 party	 organisation	 to	 the	 specific	 regional	 socio-economic	 and	 political	
conditions	and,	thus,	allows	it	to	build	electoral	support	as	a	reliable	local	actor.	Despite	the	
declining	 influence	of	mass	organisations	 in	CEE,	 these	 relations	had	an	had	an	 important	
contribution	 to	 the	 electoral	 recovery	 of	 communist	 successors	 since	 the	 1990s	 (Waller	
1995).	 Furthermore,	 since	 the	 turn	 of	 this	 century	 CEE	 experiences	 noticeable	 growth	 in	
activity	from	organised	civic	society	(Forbrig	&	Demeš	2007),	which	can	potentially	also	be	
of	 benefit	 for	 communist	 successors.	 In	 this	 context,	 if	 a	 communist	 successor	maintains	
active	 relations	with	mass	organisations	and	social	movements	across	communities,	 these	
should	 highlight	 the	 impact	 of	 party	 organisation	 on	 the	 territorial	 distribution	 of	 its	
electoral	performance.	
2.3. Transposition	
Thirdly,	 in	 order	 to	 make	 an	 impact	 of	 its	 organisational	 presence	 and	 local	
engagement,	 a	 party	 organisation	 should	 be	 able	 to	 transform	 these	 experiences	 into	
electoral	capital	on	national	elections.	This	article	calls	this	transformation	a	transposition,	
as	 it	 essentially	 requires	 a	 party	 to	 bridge	 its	 engagement	 at	 sub-national	 level	 with	
nationwide	 political	 contexts.	 Pivotal	 for	 transposition	 is	 the	 level	 of	 autonomy	 of	 sub-
national	 party	 structures	 from	 the	 national	 headquarters.	 Existing	 work	 highlighted	 that	
both,	 a	 centralised	 party	 authority	 around	 the	 party	 elite,	 if	 not	 leader	 (Grzymala-Busse	
2002;	Keith	2011),	as	well	as	decentralised	party	powers	 that	control	 the	party	 leadership	
and	provides	other	party	organs	with	powers	(Gherghina	2014;	Harmel	&	Janda	1982)	can	
lead	 to	 improved	 electoral	 performance	 at	 national	 elections.	 From	 that	 perspective,	 the	
transposition	 of	 local	 presence	 and	 engagement	 consists	 of	 two	 main	 factors.	 First,	 the	
internal	party	procedures	of	candidate	selection	can	bring	the	communist	successor	closer	
to	 communities	 across	 a	 country.	 Particularly	 this	 can	 be	 done	 by	 providing	 regional	 and	
local	 organisations	 with	 candidate	 selection	 powers,	 which	 enables	 the	 promotion	 of	
candidates	with	 local	electoral	credibility	and	reflecting	 local	conditions	 (Gherghina	2014).	
Therefore,	 by	 involving	 sub-national	 party	 organisations	 in	 the	 decision-making	 process	
related	 to	 national	 elections	 a	 communist	 successor	 highlights	 the	 importance	 of	 its	 own	
organisational	network	for	mobilising	electoral	support	across	a	country.	
Second,	the	particular	approach	of	an	electoral	campaign	can	further	 influence	the	
extent	 a	 party	 organisation	 shapes	 the	 electoral	 performance	 across	 a	 territory.	 In	 this	
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respect,	generally	at	national	elections	parties	strive	 to	communicate	a	coherent	electoral	
message	across	a	 country	 in	order	 to	maximise	 their	 voter	potential.	Hence,	 its	 campaign	
efforts	should	focus	on	ensuring	such	coherence.	In	order	to	achieve	this,	a	party	requires	a	
centralised	 electoral	 campaign	 that	 coordinates	 and	 controls	 the	 efforts	 of	 regional	 and	
local	 party	 organisations	 to	 mobilise	 support	 at	 national	 elections.	 Therefore,	 the	 more	
centralised	the	more	influential	will	be	the	party	organisation	for	the	territorial	distribution	
of	electoral	support	on	national	elections.	
Overall,	 a	 party	 organisation	 can	 influence	 the	 territorial	 distribution	 of	 electoral	
performance	in	three	main	ways.	Firstly,	it	should	be	present	across	a	country,	reflected	in	
the	 organisational	 outreach	 and	 concentration	 of	 party	members.	 Secondly,	 it	 should	 be	
engaged	 across	 communities	 through	 its	 involvement	 in	 regional	 and	 local	 politics	 and	
through	its	relations	with	non-party	organisations.	Thirdly,	it	should	be	able	to	transpose	its	
regional	 and	 local	 presence	 and	 engagement	 across	 a	 country	 into	 a	 source	 of	 electoral	
mobilisation	 at	 national	 elections	 through	 a	 decentralised	 candidate	 selection	 procedure	
and	centralised	campaign	strategy.	
3. Case	selection	and	research	methodology	
The	 Communist	 Party	 of	 Bohemia	 and	 Moravia	 (KSČM)	 is	 a	 typical	 case	 of	 the	
contemporary	experiences	of	 communist	 successor	parties	 in	CEE	 for	 three	main	 reasons.	
First,	 the	 party	 experienced	 noticeable	 decline	 in	 its	 performance	 in	 the	 last	 decade	
compared	 to	 the	 2000s.	While	 its	 average	 electoral	 support	 in	 the	 2000s	was	 15.7%,	 this	
decade	the	party	dropped	to	11.3%	on	average	(Czech	Statistical	Office	2018).	Second,	the	
party	remains	a	permanent	actor	in	the	Czech	parliamentary	arena,	in	spite	of	the	fact	that	
it	kept	‘communism’	in	its	name.	Third,	organisationally	the	party	remains	the	largest	Czech	
party	in	terms	of	membership	(Gherghina	2014),	highlighting	the	potentially	significant	role	
of	 its	 party	 organisation	 for	 its	 territorial	 distribution	 of	 electoral	 performance.	 Overall,	
KSČM	represents	one	of	the	most	likely	cases	of	shaping	its	electoral	performance	through	
its	organisational	capabilities.	
In	contrast	to	previous	studies	on	the	territorial	distribution	of	electoral	support	for	
KSČM,	this	article	relies	on	a	qualitative	research	design,	given	the	focus	on	the	role	of	party	
organisation.	This,	therefore,	demands	data	directly	or	closely	associated	with	the	party.	In	
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such	context,	primary	data	came	from	semi-structured	interviews	with	KSČM	elite	cadres	at	
national	and	regional	level,	as	well	as	with	independent	researchers	that	follow	closely	the	
developments	 of	 the	 party.	While	 such	 data,	 especially	 from	 the	 former,	may	 be	 biased,	
given	the	direct	relation	of	the	interviewee	and	the	object	of	study,	it	is	nevertheless	worth	
engaging	 in	a	discussion	with	such	sources,	as	 they	dispose	of	 rich	experience	 in	electoral	
and	 party	 politics,	 and	 thus,	 may	 provide	 important	 insights	 for	 the	 actual	 role	 of	 party	
organisation	across	different	settings.	
The	identification	of	potential	interviewees	from	KSČM	followed	a	two-stage	process.	
First,	 the	electoral	performance	of	 the	party	on	 the	2010	and	2013	election	 for	 the	 lower	
chamber	 of	 the	 Czech	 parliament,	 the	 Chamber	 of	 Deputies	 (Poslanecká	 sněmovna),	 was	
used	to	identify	places	with	consistently	different	levels	of	electoral	performance.	That	way	
the	 research	 can	 compare	 the	 role	 of	 the	 party	 organisation	 in	 qualitatively	 different	
electoral	 settings	 for	 the	 party.	 The	 analysis	 on	 the	 electoral	 performances	 of	 KSČM	was	
done	 at	 regional	 level	 (kraje),	 as	 the	 14	 Czech	 regions	 coincide	 with	 the	 electoral	
constituencies	for	parliamentary	elections.	The	analysis	at	this	stage	identified	the	Ústí	nad	
Labem,	 South	 Moravia	 and	 Capital	 City	 Prague	 regions	 as	 constituencies	 of	 consistently	
different	levels	of	electoral	support	for	KSČM	at	the	2010	and	2013	elections.	
Second,	executive	party	cadres	from	the	KSČM	regional	organisations	in	these	three	
regions	were	approached	for	an	interview,	given	their	recent	experience	in	daily	party	and	
campaign	work.	Furthermore,	executive	party	cadres	from	the	national	headquarters	were	
also	 approached	 for	 an	 interview	 in	 order	 to	 obtain	 information	 about	 the	 general	
involvement	 of	 party	 structures	 across	 the	 Czech	 Republic	 and	 the	 ways	 national	 and	
regional	 party	 structures	 approach	 national	 elections.	 The	 identification	 of	 independent	
researchers	was	based	on	their	previous	work	that	explored	the	three	party	faces	(Key	1964)	
of	 KSČM.	 These	 researchers	 are	 not	 affiliated	 with	 the	 party,	 which	 ensures	 their	
impartiality.	 The	 information	 from	 their	 interviews	 helped	 to	 triangulate	 the	 information	
from	the	elite	interviews	with	party	cadres.	
Potential	 interviewees	 were	 contacted	 via	 email	 on	 two	 separate	 waves	 in	 early	
2017.	In	total,	37	unique	potential	interviewees	were	contacted	with	28	responding	in	total.	
From	the	28	respondents,	interviews	were	successfully	conducted	with	nine	persons:	three	
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party	 representatives	 (one	 at	 national	 and	 two	 at	 regional	 level)	 and	 six	 independent	
researchers,	held	at	their	place	of	work	in	the	spring	of	2017.	While	this	may	seem	a	limited	
base	for	an	informed	and	comprehensive	assessment,	it	should	be	noted	that	parties	remain	
very	 secretive	 about	 their	 inner	 workings	 (Mudde	 2007).	 This	 is	 particularly	 the	 case	 for	
KSČM,	 as	 very	 few	 academic	 studies	 on	 the	 party	 included	 insights	 gained	 from	 elite	
interviews.	 Hence,	 even	 if	 nine	 interviews	 seem	 very	 few,	 this	 still	 is	 a	 very	 significant	
number	for	a	research	of	any	political	party.	The	discussions	with	the	interviewees	aimed	at	
gathering	their	insights	on	the	role	of	the	party	organisation	in	general	across	the	country	or	
in	 the	 particular	 region,	 in	 which	 they	 live,	 without	 the	 intent	 to	 challenge	 their	 views.	
Transcripts	of	these	interviews	were	analysed	qualitatively	with	the	aim	to	identify	common	
themes	related	to	the	influence	of	five	independent	variables	on	the	territorial	distribution	
of	electoral	performance	of	the	party.	
4. The	territorial	distribution	of	electoral	performance	of	KSČM	since	2010	
In	the	past	decade	KSČM	participated	on	three	elections	(2010,	2013,	and	2017)	with	
noticeably	volatile	results.	While	in	2013	the	party	achieved	its	second	best	vote	share	in	the	
Czech	post-communist	history	(14.9%),	in	2017	it	dropped	to	an	all-time	low	(7.8%)	(Czech	
Statistical	Office	2018).	Despite	its	electoral	volatility,	the	territorial	distribution	of	electoral	
performance	 of	 the	 party	 remains	 largely	 unchanged.	 The	 party	 consistently	 achieves	 its	
worst	results	 in	the	Prague	and	its	best	performances	in	the	Ústí	nad	Labem	constituency,	
whereas	in	the	remaining	12	constituencies	the	differences	remain	generally	marginal.	As	it	
will	be	seen	in	the	following	paragraphs,	such	combination	of	electoral	volatility	and	stable	
territorial	distribution	derives	from	an	organisational	impasse	within	KSČM,	where	the	party	
has	both	 strong	and	 lacking	organisational	 capabilities.	 In	 this	 context,	neither	of	 the	 two	
hypotheses	could	be	confirmed.	
4.1. Passive	presence	
Such	impasse	is	visible	in	the	passive	presence	of	the	party	across	the	Czech	Republic.	
While	 KSČM	 maintains	 a	 wide	 territorial	 coverage	 through	 a	 vast	 network	 of	 party	
organisations,	the	majority	of	those	organisations	remain	rather	inactive.	The	party	remains	
one	 of	 the	 largest	 political	 parties	 in	 the	 Czech	 Republic	 by	 membership	 numbers	 (van	
Biezen	et	al.	2012).	 It	also	enjoys	a	dense	organisational	network	 that	 stretches	across	all	
regions	 and	 districts	 of	 the	 country,	 as	 well	 it	 is	 present	 in	 a	 majority	 of	 municipalities,	
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according	 to	 data	 from	 the	 official	website	 of	 KSČM.	 As	 one	 party	member	 states	 in	 this	
respect:	 ‘We	 are	 still	 a	 mass	 party	 […]	 other	 parties	 don’t	 have	 structures,	 don’t	 use	
members’	(Interview	E,	2017).	This	allows	KSČM	to	‘combine	different	levels	of	activities	to	
[address]	issues’	(Interview	E,	2017),	suggesting	that	the	stability	of	the	territorial	pattern	of	
electoral	support	is	enshrined	in	its	party	complexity.	
However,	 despite	 this	 comprehensive	 organisational	 presence,	 the	 party	 remains	
rather	disengaged	and	inactive	across	communities.	This	is	particularly	visible	in	the	lack	of	a	
correlation	between	number	of	members	and	electoral	performance.	While	official	data	 is	
not	accessible,	the	conversations	revealed	that	the	party	has	its	largest	party	organisation	in	
Prague,	where	the	party	continuously	fails	to	mobilise	significant	support.	One	party	cadre	
explains	this	trend	with	the	socio-economic	conditions	in	the	city:	‘We	are	able	to	mobilise	
vast	numbers	of	members	here	in	Prague,	but	the	overall	situation	of	wealth	does	not	allow	
us	 to	 perform	 better’	 (Interview	 E,	 2017).	 More	 importantly,	 despite	 the	 importance	 of	
organisation	and	members,	 the	conversations	revealed	significant	challenges	 for	 the	party	
to	maintain	this	network.	One	party	cadre	highlights	the	problem,	stating	that	‘we	have	now	
villages,	where	our	local	party	organization	does	not	exist	since	already	10	years,	[although]	
people	 still	 vote	 for	 us	 there’	 (Interview	 G,	 2017).	 Main	 reason	 for	 this	 is	 the	 declining	
activity	of	party	members:	‘Our	members,	unfortunately,	are	unable	to	actively	support	us	
for	a	long	time.	That	is	why	we	often	don’t	know	whether	a	party	organisation	in	a	particular	
place,	especially	if	it	is	a	small	place,	still	exists’	(Interview	G,	2017).	
An	 important	reason	for	 the	passivity	of	party	members	 is	 the	 lack	of	generational	
turnover	within	the	party.	‘What	we	lack	is	attracting	younger	members,	engaging	the	youth,	
we	face	real	challenges	there’,	highlights	a	party	member	(Interview	E,	2017).	Another	adds	
that	 ‘to	 attract	 the	 youth	we	would	need	a	 fundamental	 change	 in	our	 structures,	 in	 our	
approach,	 in	 our	 work,	 but	 I	 don’t	 see	 that	 happening	 for	 now’	 (Interview	 G,	 2017).	 An	
independent	researcher	explains	that	the	sources	for	the	lack	of	generational	turnover	are	
to	be	found	in	the	traditionalist	image	of	the	party.	‘The	youth	is	in	the	big	cities,	studying	or	
travelling	to	work,	very	few	of	them	remain	in	their	place	of	living.	[...]	This	party,	however,	
seems	out-dated	for	them,	very	conservative,	very	unattractive;	 it	does	not	correspond	to	
their	 rather	 cosmopolitan	 views’	 (Interview	 C,	 2017).	 As	 another	 independent	 researcher	
highlights	 this	 is	 a	major	 issue	 even	 for	 those	 who	 enter	 the	 party	 to	 develop	 as	 career	
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politicians.	 ‘KSČM	is	very	open	for	newcomers	and	will	almost	 immediately	place	them	on	
top	places	on	their	lists	for	local	elections,	for	example.	[...]	But	you	do	some	work	and	start	
to	engage	with	 the	party	and	you	clash	with	an	 ideological	wall,	which	discourages	many’	
(Interview	H,	2017).	
The	outcome	of	 such	passivity	 is	 the	 general	 difficulty	 of	 the	party	 to	 address	 the	
particular	regional	or	local	socio-economic	conditions	across	the	country	and,	hence	to	build	
electoral	 support.	 According	 to	 the	 interviews	 these	 conditions	 determine	 the	 extent	 of	
support	 for	 the	 party	 across	 the	 country.	 For	 example,	 when	 discussing	 the	 party	
performance	 in	 Prague,	 a	 party	 representative	 immediately	 stressed	 that	 the	 city	 is	 an	
economic,	financial,	and	service	centre	of	the	Czech	Republic	and	its	overall	higher	standard	
of	 living	 is	 an	 important	 reason	 for	 the	 limited	 interest	 in	 the	 topics	 that	 the	party	 raises	
(Interview	E,	2017).	In	discussions	with	independent	researchers,	it	comes	out	that	Prague	is	
not	an	exception	in	this	respect,	as	other	major	cities,	such	as	Brno	or	Liberec,	are	in	similar	
situation:	 a	 high	 standard	 of	 living	 stifles	 the	 appeal	 of	 topics	 raised	 by	 the	 communists	
(Interview	B,	2017;	Interview	C,	2017).	This	suggests	that	due	to	its	organisational	passivity,	
the	party	is	unable	to	offer	a	relevant	political	agenda	across	communities,	highlighting	the	
potentially	 limited	 role	 of	 party	 organisation	 for	 its	 electoral	 performance	 and	 territorial	
distribution.	
Despite	its	inability	to	mobilise	support	in	places,	where	the	party	underperforms	or	
achieves	relatively	average	results,	KSČM	remains	a	viable	electoral	option	in	its	strongholds.	
As	 the	 interviews	 highlighted,	 the	 historical	 legacies	 from	 the	 authoritarian	 communist	
regime	in	the	country	remain	a	major	source	of	electoral	mobilisation	for	the	party.	A	party	
member	states	in	this	respect	that	KSČM	‘reaps	the	[voters’]	experiences	from	the	previous	
regime’	 (Interview	G,	2017),	suggesting	that	 it	 is	 the	 individual	relation	to	the	past	regime	
that	determines	whether	a	person	would	support	the	party.	This	is	particularly	visible	in	the	
sources	 for	 its	 strong	 support	 in	 the	 border	 areas	 of	 the	 Czech	 Republic.	 First,	 a	 party	
member	from	Ústí	nad	Labem	pointed	out	the	loss	of	industries	and	services	after	1990	as	
an	important	factor	that	mobilises	people	in	the	region	to	vote	for	KSČM	(Interview	F,	2017).	
This	highlights	that	the	social	context	of	economic	and	social	decline	is	an	important	factor	
for	 the	 strong	 electoral	 performances	 of	 the	 party	 in	 the	 Czech	 peripheries.	 Second,	
conversations	 with	 independent	 researchers	 attributed	 the	 strong	 support	 for	 the	 party	
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there	with	the	concentration	of	former	border	guards	alongside	the	former	Sudeten	region	
(Interview	A,	2017;	Interview	I,	2017).	Given	that	former	border	guards	remain	an	important	
social	 constituency	 for	 the	 party	 (Holubec	 2011),	 especially	 in	 Czech	 border	 areas	 where	
KSČM	maintains	an	image	of	a	representative	of	minor	regional	interests	(Lach	et	al.	2010),	
it	 seems	 that	 their	 stable	 territorial	 distribution	 of	 electoral	 performance	 stems	 from	 the	
strong	linkage	between	the	party	and	its	core	voters.	This,	therefore,	suggests	that	the	role	
of	its	party	organisation	is	to	maintain	this	linkage,	while	it	is	unable	to	provide	resources	for	
expanding	its	electoral	base.	
4.2. Hollowed-out	engagement	
Its	 organisational	 passivity	 is	 also	 visible	 in	 the	 rather	 limited	 engagement	 with	
communities.	 In	 terms	 of	 involvement	 in	 regional	 politics,	 the	 party	 achieved	 noticeable	
success	 at	 regional	 elections	 in	 the	past	 decade,	 but	 fails	 to	use	 it	 to	mobilise	 support	 at	
national	 polls.	 In	 the	 late	 1990s	 the	 Czech	 Republic	 introduced	 a	 comprehensive	
administrative	 reform	 that	 saw	 the	 introduction	 of	 14	 regions	 with	 some	 executive	 and	
legislative	 authority,	 enshrined	 in	 regional	 governments	 and	 parliaments	 (Baun	 &	Marek	
2006).	Since	2002	KSČM	entered	into	regional	governments	in	12	of	those	(only	the	Prague	
and	 Liberec	 regions	 have	 not	 had	 a	 communist	 participation	 in	 regional	 government),	
experiencing	 significant	 rise	 in	 support	 at	 the	 2012	 regional	 elections	 (Ryšavý	 2013)	 and	
decline	in	2016	(Pink	&	Eibl	2018).	This	suggests	that	its	party	organisation	across	the	Czech	
Republic	maintains	significant	organisational	capabilities	to	engage	with	communities.	
Participation	 in	 regional	 politics,	 however,	 does	 not	 translate	 into	 an	 improved	
electoral	 potential	 for	 the	 party	 at	 national	 elections	 for	 two	 main	 reasons.	 First,	 KSČM	
party	 cadres	 at	 national	 and	 regional	 levels	 were	 unanimous	 that	 regional	 politics	 have	
limited	 impact	 at	 national	 elections.	 This	 is	 due	 to	 the	 rather	 de-politicised	 nature	 of	
regional	politics.	An	independent	researcher	states	that	‘the	region	is	the	last	[place]	where	
people	think	[it]	can	change	something	for	them.	Prague	is	too	far,	it’s	only	taxes,	but	when	
it’s	a	social	question	it	is	a	local	question,	but	it	is	not	an	ideological	question,	not	a	political	
struggle,	 people	 had	 to	 live	 together”	 (Interview	 B,	 2017).	 In	 other	 words,	 it	 seems	 that	
regional	politics	in	the	Czech	Republic	remain	rather	detached	from	national	politics.	Second,	
although	 the	 involvement	 of	 the	 party	 in	 regional	 politics	 allowed	 it	 to	 detoxify	 to	 some	
extent	 its	 pariah	 image	 across	 the	 country	 (Interview	 E,	 2017),	 an	 regional	 party	 cadre	
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assesses	 its	 government	 experience	 as	 a	 problem	 for	 KSČM,	 as	 it	 has	 to	 carry	 the	
responsibility	for	the	effects	of	national	and	regional	politics	on	the	regions	where	they	are	
or	were	on	power	 (Interview	F,	 2017).	Hence,	despite	 its	 involvement	 in	 regional	politics,	
the	party	does	not	seem	capable	to	build	up	electoral	support	across	the	country	given	its	
government	record	and	the	relative	detachment	between	regional	and	national	politics.	
Similarly,	 the	party	 remains	 rather	 isolated	 in	 its	 relations	with	potential	non-party	
organisations.	The	interviews	reveal	that	KSČM	maintains	a	network	of	front	organisations	
that,	however,	have	limited	social	influence.	Beyond	these	the	most	effective	organisation,	
affiliated	with	 the	party,	 remains	 the	Club	of	Czech	Border	Areas	 (Klub	českého	pohraničí)	
that	 according	 to	 independent	 researchers	 still	 is	 an	 important	 source	 for	 electoral	
mobilisation	 in	 the	 Czech	 peripheries	 due	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 mobility	 in	 these	 places	 (e.g.	
Interview	D,	 2017).	 Furthermore,	 despite	 the	 emergence	of	 a	 relatively	 young,	 yet	 hardly	
influential	 radical	 left	 milieu	 of	 social	 movements	 in	 the	 country,	 the	 party	 has	 limited	
connections	 to	 it.	 Main	 reason	 for	 this	 is	 ideological	 differences:	 ‘[…]	 many	 of	 these	
organisations	 remain	 very	 anti-communist	 and	 suspicious	 for	 associating	 with	 the	
communists.	 Some	 of	 them	 are	 even	more	 radical	 than	 KSČM,	 so	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 find	 a	
common	 ground’	 (Interview	 B,	 2017)	 states	 an	 independent	 researcher	 in	 this	 respect.	
Similarly,	 linkages	 to	 mass	 organisations	 are	 also	 rather	 marginal	 for	 two	 reasons.	 First,	
trade	unions	maintain	rather	closer	 links	to	the	major	social	democratic	competitor	of	the	
party,	 the	 Czech	 Social	 Democratic	 Party	 (ČSSD),	 particularly	 in	 Moravia,	 which	 prevents	
KSČM	from	expanding	its	electoral	potential	(Interview	D	2017;	Interview	E,	2017).	Second,	
even	 when	 KSČM	 may	 enjoy	 some	 good	 relations	 with	 trade	 unions,	 these	 are	 rather	
geographically	 restricted:	 ‘It	depends	where	any	 trade	union	 sees	 it	 feasible	 to	work	with	
the	communists.	For	example,	 in	Ostrava	they	work	very	well,	because	of	the	huge	mining	
business	 there,	 but	 across	 the	 country	 trade	 unions	 are	 reluctant	 in	 having	 something	 in	
common	 with	 them’	 (Interview	 D,	 2017).	 Overall,	 it	 seems	 that	 the	 party	 could	 not	
compensate	for	its	organisational	passivity	through	its	linkages	to	non-party	organisations.	
The	 result	of	 the	 limited	 relevance	of	 the	 involvement	 in	 regional	politics	of	KSČM	
and	its	limited	linkages	to	non-party	organisations	is	the	lack	of	competitive	advantages	for	
the	party	vis-à-vis	its	direct	electoral	opponents.	According	to	the	interviews,	the	territorial	
distribution	of	electoral	performance	depends	to	very	large	extent	on	the	competition	with	
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ČSSD,	 described	by	 an	 independent	 researcher	 as	 a	 ‘zero-sum	game’	 (Interview	H,	 2017).	
This	is	due	to	the	fact	that	the	two	left-wing	parties	are	perceived	as	very	similar	entities	by	
the	public.	One	party	cadre	explains	in	this	respect	that	‘people	don’t	see	major	differences	
between	us	[and	ČSSD];	the	more	they	don’t	see	a	difference,	it	is	dangerous	for	us	because	
of	[the	parliamentary]	influence	[of	the	social	democrats]	after	the	elections’	(Interview	G,	
2017).	 Another	 party	 cadre	 emphasises	 that	 such	 danger	 is	 more	 accelerated	 by	 their	
differences	in	financial	resources:	‘We	cannot	compete	with	financially	healthy	parties,	such	
as	the	ČSSD’	(Interview	F,	2017).	Hence,	while	KSČM	cannot	present	a	distinctively	different	
ideological	profile	to	the	social	democrats,	its	financial	disadvantage	could	not	be	overcome	
through	its	organisational	capabilities.	
Furthermore,	 given	 the	 similar	 ideological	 profiles	 of	 the	 two	 parties,	 they	 also	
compete	 for	 similar	 social	 groups,	 described	 by	 one	 independent	 researcher	 as	 ‘natural	
unity	 of	 [their	 voters]	 and	 the	 [current]	 closeness	 of	 both	 parties’	 (Interview	 H,	 2017),	
especially	 at	 regional	 level	 (Interview	 H,	 2017;	 Interview	 D,	 2017).	 In	 such	 context	 the	
intensity	of	 their	 competition	offers	a	potential	advantage	 for	KSČM	following	a	period	 in	
government	 for	 the	 social	 democrats:	 ‘When	 [ČSSD]	 are	 in	 power,	 then	 the	 communists	
benefit,	 as	 they	 can	 criticise	 the	 government	 from	 left-wing	 positions,	 but	 if	 the	 social	
democrats	are	in	opposition	as	well,	then	the	communists	are	in	trouble’	(Interview	H,	2017).	
Yet,	 the	past	decade	 saw	ČSSD	government	participation	only	 since	2013,	 suggesting	 that	
KSČM	 was	 not	 able	 to	 benefit	 from	 this	 advantage	 due	 to	 their	 similar	 status	 of	
parliamentary	opposition.	Only	in	the	2017	elections	KSČM	benefited	from	the	government	
participation	of	ČSSD,	overcoming	 its	 social	 democratic	opponents	 for	 the	 first	 time	 since	
1992.	 Therefore,	 rather	 than	 the	 role	 of	 its	 party	 organisation,	 it	 is	 the	 different	 political	
status	of	KSČM	that	allows	it	to	compete	with	the	social	democrats.	
Yet,	 when	 the	 party	 faces	 electoral	 competition	 from	 parties	 of	 similar	 political	
status,	 particularly	 from	 other	 anti-political	 establishment	 opponents,	 it	 rather	 fails	 to	
respond	properly.	A	party	cadre	was	clear	that	KSČM	fails	to	maximise	its	electoral	potential	
among	protest	voters,	as	other	parties	‘offer	[them]	more	options	to	choose’	(Interview	E,	
2017).	Particular	competition	 in	this	respect	 is	seen	 in	the	centrist	populist	ANO	2011	and	
the	 radical	 right	 Freedom	 and	 Direct	 Democracy	 (Interview	 D,	 2017;	 Interview	 A,	 2017),	
mentioned	 regularly	 as	 direct	 challengers	 in	 communist	 strongholds.	 According	 to	 party	
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cadres,	 the	direct	 access	 to	mainstream	media	outlets	 for	 these	 two	parties	 (Interview	E,	
2017;	 Interview	G,	 2017)	 is	 a	major	 reason	 for	 the	 inabilities	of	 KSČM	 to	 respond	 to	 that	
challenge.	Hence,	whereas	its	anti-political	establishment	competitors	have	the	competitive	
advantage	 of	 media	 presence,	 KSČM	 could	 not	 compensate	 this	 organisationally,	
highlighting	 a	 rather	 limited	 contribution	 of	 its	 party	 organisation	 to	 its	 electoral	
performance	and	territorial	distribution.	
4.3. Centralised	disorganisation	
The	 organisational	 impasse	 of	 the	 party	 is	 mostly	 visible	 in	 its	 limited	 abilities	 to	
transpose	 its	organisational	presence	and	engagement	across	communities	 into	source	for	
mobilisation	 at	 national	 elections.	 This	 is	 particularly	 the	 case	 regarding	 its	 candidate	
selections	 process.	 According	 to	 the	 party	 status	 candidates	 for	 national	 positions	 are	
subject	of	selection	through	primaries	among	party	members	 (KSČM	2016).	Yet,	 the	same	
party	status	also	indicates	that	these	selections	are	mere	nomination	and	may	be	altered	at	
local	and	regional	 level,	while	 the	Central	Committee	of	 the	party	has	 final	 say	on	the	 list	
order	 (KSČM	 2016).	 This	 suggests	 a	 slightly	 centralised	 decision-making	 process	 that	
potentially	 prevents	 the	 party	 from	 fielding	 candidates	 with	 local	 credibility	 on	 electable	
places.	More	importantly,	the	way	the	candidate	selection	process	is	conducted	suggests	a	
limited	 interest	 of	 regional	 and	 local	 organisations	 in	 it.	 For	 example,	 a	 party	 cadre	 at	
regional	 level	 described	 their	 involvement	 the	 following	 way:	 ‘well,	 we	 make	 our	
recommendation	to	the	Central	Committee	and	then	they	confirm	it	and	that’s	it’	(Interview	
F,	2017).	This	suggests	that	sub-national	party	organisations	have	limited	involvement	and,	
hence,	contribution	to	the	electoral	performance	of	the	party	at	national	elections.	
The	limited	involvement	of	regional	and	local	party	organisations	is	also	noticeable	in	
the	way	 the	 party	 campaigns	 during	 elections.	 The	 interviews	 reveal	 that	 KSČM	 is	mainly	
focused	at	distributing	a	common	message	without	much	experimentation	and	innovation.	
A	party	cadre	states	that	 ‘we	don’t	have	different	campaigns,	we	make	meetings	with	our	
members	 across	 the	 country	 and	 that’s	 it’	 (Interview	 E,	 2017).	 Reason	 for	 the	 lack	 of	
experimentation	is	previous	failed	attempts	to	do	so:	‘[KSČM]	tried	in	2010	to	do	a	modern	
campaign,	with	billboards	and	TV	spots,	but	they	haven’t	got	any	better	in	terms	of	electoral	
support,	 so	 that’s	 why	 they	 stopped	 doing	 it’	 (Interview	 H,	 2017).	 Furthermore,	 the	
campaign	seems	 to	have	 rather	 limited	goals,	 concentrated	solely	on	 ‘informing	 the	party	
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members	and	supporters	about	the	elections,	nothing	else.	That’s	why	they	don’t	require	a	
more	 sophisticated	 campaign’	 (Interview	 I,	 2017).	 In	 such	 context,	 the	 regional	 and	 local	
party	 structures	 at	 national	 ones	 are	 involved	 as	 much	 as	 they	 facilitate	 the	 electoral	
campaign	 in	 their	 region	 devised	 by	 the	 national	 headquarters	 (Interview	 F,	 2017).	
Therefore,	 while	 the	 party	 maintains	 a	 rather	 centralised	 campaign	 effort,	 it	 is	 rather	
hollowed	out	due	to	the	limited,	rather	technical	involvement	of	its	sub-national	structures	
in	it.	
An	important	reason	for	such	limited	involvement	is	an	apparent	mismatch	between	
the	party	goals	at	regional	and	at	national	 levels.	An	independent	researcher	hints	at	such	
mismatch	 the	 following	 way:	 ‘regional	 party	 [representatives]	 are	 very	 distanced	 from	
national	politics	and	very	pragmatic	in	their	work	in	the	region.	Certainly	communism	gives	
them	 some	 value	orientation	 for	 their	 choices,	 but	 generally	 they	don’t	 really	 differ	 from	
any	other	politicians	on	regional	levels’	(Interview	H,	2017).	This	suggests	that	the	political	
expertise	and	behaviour	of	regional	KSČM	politicians	 in	qualitatively	different	from	that	of	
national	 ones.	 Such	 difference	 in	 goals	 and	 behaviour	 is	 particularly	 at	 the	 core	 at	 the	
inability	 of	 the	 party	 to	 transpose	 its	 government	 involvement	 at	 regional	 level	 into	 an	
electoral	asset	at	national	elections.	As	one	regional	representative	explains:	
‘The	party	at	national	level	should	present	what	it	has	achieved;	we	have	mayors	in	
towns	and	municipalities	and	we	have	achieved	lots	of	things	at	regional	and	local	levels,	so	
they	can	use	the	achievements	of	 [our	region]	 to	do	that.	But	 if	 the	general	policy	 [in	 the	
central	headquarters]	in	Prague	is	to	play	the	role	of	the	opposition,	they	will	not	be	willing	
to	point	these	things’	(Interview	F,	2017).	
This	 suggests	 that	 the	party	organisation	purposefully	chooses	not	 to	 transpose	 its	
involvement	 in	 regional	 politics	 due	 to	 an	 apparent	 incongruence	 between	 the	 office-
oriented	 regional	 party	 branches	 and	 the	 rather	 anti-political	 establishment	 and	 policy-
oriented	national	headquarters.	
Overall,	in	the	past	decade	KSČM	has	considerable	organisational	capabilities	in	the	
three	 elements	 of	 party	 organisation,	 as	 well	 as	 it	 lack	 in	 them	 (Table	 1).	 It	 maintains	 a	
rather	 passive	 presence	 across	 the	 country,	 which	 enables	 the	 party	 to	mobilise	 its	 core	
supporters,	but	prevents	 it	 from	building	up	a	stable	electoral	support	across	the	country.	
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Furthermore,	while	the	party	is	engaged	with	communities	by	providing	them	with	political	
representation	 at	 regional	 and	 national	 levels,	 KSČM	 remains	 rather	 isolated	 entity,	
particularly	given	 its	 limited	 linkages	to	non-party	organisations.	Furthermore,	 the	party	 is	
unable	to	transpose	its	organisational	presence	and	involvement	across	communities	mainly	
due	 to	 its	 highly	 centralised	 candidate	 selections	 procedures	 despite	 its	 centralised	
campaign	effort.	As	the	previous	sections,	however,	highlighted	the	majority	of	its	positive	
aspects	seemed	rather	hollowed	out.	This	is	particularly	visible	in	the	inability	of	the	party	to	
use	 its	 involvement	 in	 regional	 politics	 due	 to	 the	 detachment	 between	 regional	 and	
national	politics,	as	well	as	 the	mismatch	of	party	goals	between	 its	 regional	and	national	
party	 organisation.	 Furthermore,	 although	 the	 party	 has	 centralised	 campaign	 strategy,	 it	
lacks	innovation	and	fails	to	involve	significantly	its	sub-national	structures.	Therefore,	while	
its	party	organisation	provides	KSČM	with	sufficient	 resources	 to	sustain	 its	parliamentary	
presence	at	national	level,	the	party	fails	to	use	them	to	expand	its	electoral	potential	visible	
in	a	rather	stable	electoral	geography	and	volatile	electoral	performance.	In	light	of	the	two	
hypotheses	 of	 this	 article,	 it	 seems	 that	 neither	 of	 them	 can	 be	 confirmed	 due	 to	 the	
organisational	impasse	of	the	party.	
5. Conclusion	
The	 party	 organisation	 still	 matters	 for	 the	 electoral	 performance	 of	 communist	
successor	parties	even	almost	three	decades	since	the	end	of	the	authoritarian	communist	
regimes	in	Central	and	Eastern	Europe.	As	this	article	revealed	a	party	needs	to	be	present	
across	a	country,	engaged	with	communities	and	able	to	use	this	presence	and	engagement	
for	 its	goals.	 In	the	particular	case	of	KSČM	this	was	not	entirely	the	case.	While	the	party	
was	electorally	volatile	 in	 the	past	decade,	 its	 territorial	distribution	 remained	stable.	The	
evidence	 from	 series	 of	 semi-structured	 interviews	 reveals	 that	 this	 is	 due	 to	 an	
organisational	 impasse	 within	 the	 party.	 While	 on	 the	 one	 hand	 KSČM	 remains	 present	
across	communities	and,	thus,	 is	able	to	mobilise	 its	core	voters,	 its	declining	engagement	
and	 reluctance	 to	 use	 its	 local	 legitimacy	 for	 electoral	 purposes	 on	 national	 elections	
prevent	 the	 party	 to	 manage	 the	 volatile	 influences	 of	 the	 external	 socio-economic	 and	
political	 environment.	 Hence,	 while	 its	 organisational	 presence	 secures	 a	 certain	 level	 of	
electoral	 support,	 the	 party	 is	 unable	 to	 expand	 electorally.	 In	 this	 context,	 party	
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organisation	 indeed	 still	 matters	 for	 the	 electoral	 performance	 of	 communist	 successors,	
but	it	also	highlights	major	challenges.	
These	insights	have	important	implications	in	three	main	directions.	First,	the	case	of	
KSČM	 reveals	 an	 important	 caveat	 for	 the	 contribution	 of	 party	 organisation	 to	 electoral	
performance.	While	the	article	confirms	the	relevance	of	organisational	strength	for	political	
parties	in	CEE,	this	should	be	understood	in	relative	terms.	Particularly,	the	evidence	of	this	
article	reveals	that	the	party	organisation	is	strong	not	because	of	its	numbers,	but	because	
of	 how	 it	 uses	 its	 resources	 and	 opportunities.	 Second,	 this	 article	 highlighted	 the	
continuous	relevance	of	communist	successor	origins	for	the	majority	of	left-wing	parties	in	
CEE.	 On	 the	 one	 hand	 it	 may	 seem	 odd	 to	 still	 refer	 to	 these	 parties	 as	 communist	
successors,	 given	 that	 in	 the	 past	 almost	 thirty	 years	 they	 came	 in	 terms	 with	 their	
authoritarian	past.	On	the	other	hand,	however,	 these	parties	still	 remain	organisationally	
strong	through	their	main	organisational	inheritance	from	their	communist	predecessors,	a	
comprehensive	party	network	and	large	membership.	This	suggests	that	while	these	parties	
changed	ideologically	towards	a	catch-all	profile,	their	legacy	of	being	a	mass	party	still	has	
implications	for	their	functioning	within	the	party	systems	in	CEE.	Therefore,	future	studies	
may	 need	 to	 recognise	 the	 influence	 of	 their	 party	 origins	 even	 after	 the	 substantial	
ideological	and	organisation	change	these	parties	went	through.	
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Table	1.	Organisational	capabilities	of	KSČM	since	2010	
Analytical	dimension	 Empirical	indicator	 Capability	level	
Presence	 Territorial	outreach	 High	
	 Active	members	 Low	
Engagement	 Regional	representation	 High	
	 Relations	with	non-party	organisations	 Low	
Transposition	 Candidate	selection	procedures	 Low	
	 Electoral	campaign	 High	
	
	
Table	2.	List	of	cited	interviews	
Interview	A	 Independent	researcher,	26	May	2017,	Brno	CZ	
Interview	B	 Independent	researcher,	23	May	2017,	Prague	CZ	
Interview	C	 Independent	researcher,	23	May	2017,	Prague	CZ	
Interview	D	 Independent	researcher,	25	May	2017,	Brno	CZ	
Interview	E	 Party	cadre	at	regional	level,	22	May	2017,	Prague	CZ	
Interview	F	 Party	cadre	at	regional	level,	24	May	2017,	Ústí	nad	Labem	CZ	
Interview	G	 Party	cadre	at	national	level,	23	May	2017,	Prague	CZ	
Interview	H	 Independent	researcher,	23	May	2017,	Prague	CZ	
Interview	I	 Independent	researcher,	25	May	2017,	Brno	CZ	
	
